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The detraditionalization in Norway is more marketed than in many other European countries. 
Women have more freedom to choose how much they want to work, what they want to study, 
and generally more freedom to decide how they want to live their lives. With 
detraditionalization, women gained more bargaining power also within the household, giving 
them more freedom to negotiate the equal distribution of unpaid work with their partners. 
However, if the man still has traditional gender norms, he will probably do not accept the 
women’s desire for equality, which can, in turn, increase the probability of household 
dissolution. This thesis investigates whether higher bargaining power among women in the 
household is associated with a higher risk for household dissolution. More specifically, I test 
that when the wife’s hourly wage, number of hours spent at work, education, and age are 
higher than her husband’s, the probability of separation increases. To test my hypothesis, I 
use register data from Statistics Norway. I analyze the data by use of logistic regression in the 
analytical tool microdata.no. I find that the risk of household dissolution is negatively 
correlated with the income and education level in the household. However, in households 
where the woman has a relatively higher wage or education than the man, the risk of 
separation is higher than in a household where the woman is relatively less educated or earns 
less. I further find that working full time is associated with a higher risk of household 
dissolution for the woman, but not for the man. The results indicate that even in Norway, 
where relatively few people agree with traditional gender norms, gender conflict may still be 
an issue. 
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1 Introduction  
Norway is a country where the detraditionalization processes are most marked (Ellingsæter, 
2018). Women work almost as much as men, have a high level of education, participate in 
political decisions, and have generally gained more power in society. Which in itself is very 
good. On the other hand, we also see declining fertility rates and significant changes in 
marital institutions as a direct effect of the detraditionalization processes. More people choose 
cohabitation over marriage, and children born out of wedlock are no longer ashamed. The 
frequency of divorces has also increased. Countries where women have high occupational 
activity, such as the Nordic countries, have a higher divorce rate, lower propensity to marry, a 
higher proportion of cohabitants, compared with countries where gender tradition and religion 
are still strong (Kalmijn, 2007). In the Nordic countries, the distinction between marriage and 
cohabitation is more or less blurred (A. J. Cherlin, 2004). In Norway, the cohabitant’s rights 
and obligations (parenthood, tax, inheritance, etc.) are legally regulated. They are almost 
equal to marriage (Ellingsæter, 2018). Despite the changes, the majority of us choose to get 
married anyway (A. J. Cherlin, 2004; Sobotka & Toulemon, 2008). The only difference from 
then until now is that those who choose to get married are more selected.  
 
Although gender roles are not so strong in Norway, this does not apply to all other countries. 
The data presented in Table 1, retrieved from ISSP Research Group (ISSP, 2016), presents 
European counties that gave their answer to the statement: Men’s job is to earn money, 
women’s job is to look after the home. The proportion of those who answered “strongly 
agree” or “agree” is presented in Table 1. We can indeed see that Ellingsæter (2018) is right 
about detraditionalization processes in Norway. There are just 5.1% of those who responded 
agree with the statement. On the other hand, we can see that in Slovakia, over half of the 
respondents agree with the statement (53,7%). This indicates that traditional gender norms are 
still strong in the country and also in other countries like Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, etc. 
 
On the other hand, with the most marked detraditionalization processes, women in Norway 
still earn much less than men. In 2019, women’s average monthly salary per full-time was 
87.6 % of men’s salary. In 1998 women’s monthly wages accounted for 83.6 % of men’s 





Table 1: The proportion of respondents agreeing with the statement: Men’s job is to earn money; women’s job is 
to look after the home, separated by country in Europe. Data from 2012 (ISSP, 2016) 
 
 
The detraditionalization processes gave the women more bargaining power in family life, and 
it is interesting to see if this power can explain the increased divorce rate. The objective of 
this study is to examine whether higher bargaining power among women in the household is 
associated with a higher risk for household dissolution. My research question builds on 
previous work by, e.g., Becker (1977,1991), Manser and Brown (1980), and Pollak 
(1994,1996,2005). To test my hypothesis, I use register data on married couples with small 
children from 2017-2018 from statistics Norway, and the estimations presented are computed 
using the logistic regression model. 
 
1.1 Theoretical background 
The most popular theoretical perspectives on the destabilizing effects of wife’s labor market 
activity stand on work done by Becker (Gary S. Becker, 1991) and the New Home 
Economists’ (Becker et al., 1977). The fundamental assumption of Becker’s theory is that the 
husband is the household’s main breadwinner, predicting that higher earnings for men would 
enhance marriage stability. However, the theory also assumes that only the husband 
contributes to the family income, making him an altruist who makes decisions. Hence, there 
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So, Becker’s model assumes that the household can be treated as one unit, with one set of 
preferences, and that the aim of the household is to maximize consumption of goods and 
“household services.” But men and women do not have preferences for what they do (market 
or household work); they care about a general “output.” If men have a comparative advantage 
in market work, men will work, and women stay home. The problem is that Becker’s model 
can’t explain why so many households break up, even when there is a comparative advantage. 
Manser and Brown (Manser & Brown, 1980) and Lundberg and Pollak (Lundberg & Pollak, 
1996) note that men and women do not only care about “output” and that they have individual 
preferences that can collide; both want to do market work, for example. But if the household 
members can’t agree on how to share the work (household and/or market), the household risk 
dissolving. 
Now on to bargaining power. Suppose the man has all the bargaining power and prefers to do 
market work while the woman does household work, and the woman has minimal outside 
options, like in the early 1900s, for example. In that case, the household will stay intact, and 
the woman will do household work, even if she would prefer to do market work. In this 
situation, if women outside options increase, giving them more possibility to support 
themselves, the divorce rate will go up.  
Hence, Becker’s unitary model is no longer relevant today as it once was, especially in the 
Norwegian context where we have the high rates of female labor force participation and 
university admission (Lyngstad, 2004).  
 
Manser and Brown (1980) and Lundberg and Pollak (Lundberg & Pollak, 1996) have a 
somewhat different view of the problem. They criticized the assumption that the household 
can be treated as a single unit and that the sole decision-maker is the husband. Manser and 
Brown (1980) argued that the household members have different utility functions and 
different preferences that do not always coincide. Consequently, the distribution of market 
and household work is an outcome of a bargaining process between spouses. Manser and 
Brown assumed that a cooperative bargaining model could represent this bargaining process. 
In this model, the outcome of the bargaining process depends on 1) the differences in 





power, in turn, is determined by each spouse outside options if the household dissolves (i.e., if 
the spouses fail to reach an agreement). 
Their bargaining model allows for different interests of husband and wives where formation 
and dissolution of marriages offer a beginning and an end to the family allocation.  
 
According to Pollak (Pollak, 1994) are not only the resources controlled by each of the 
spouses or the total household income that matters but also the portion of resources controlled 
by the wife. Further, he discusses that the economic independence of the women increases her 
bargaining power within the household, which can give her the opportunity to negotiate, for 
example, a more favorable division of household labor.  
 
Let us start with a typical cooperative bargaining model with only two members: a wife and a 
husband. His or her consumption of private goods depends on their individual utility function: 
𝑈𝑤 for the wife and 𝑈ℎ for the husband. Now, if they fail to reach an agreement, the payoff 
they receive can be represented by a “threat point” (𝑆𝑤 , 𝑆ℎ) – the utility they will receive in 
the event of divorce. Now, let us try to understand the gains from cooperative bargaining and 
refer to 𝑅𝑖 as the utility individual 𝑖 gets from the marriage/relationship. 𝑆𝑖 will represent the 
utility 𝑖 gets from being single, or if you like, alone. I use subscripts 𝑚 and 𝑓 when it matters 
instead of 𝑖 and 𝑗 to point out when it is valid for males or females. Each individual has a 
unique utility that they get from marriage, 𝑅𝑖, that arises from the factors like love, sex, 
children, and other marital public goods. As long as agreement on how to allocate resources 
exists, spouses will remain together. The total surplus from staying as a household can then be 
written: 
𝑅𝑖 + 𝑅𝑗 − 𝑆𝑖 − 𝑆𝑗  
In an event where they fail to cooperate, the best they can get then is 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑆𝑗 – the treat 
points in the cooperative bargaining game. Individuals are no longer satisfied with the 
relationship because 𝑅 < 𝑆, hence the solution 𝑆 is more preferable. So, the actual values of 
𝑅𝑖 and 𝑅𝑗 are determined from the spouses bargaining on how the surpluses must be split. If 
there is no surplus from marriage, then both will want to walk away. We have then: 





This could also happen in a situation where one spouse has a benefit from the household (𝑅 >
𝑆), but the other does not (𝑅 > 𝑆), and that the disadvantage of the latter is so big that it 
outweighs the positive surplus for the other spouse. 
 
Some important characteristics of the cooperative bargaining problem were introduced by 
John Nash, winner of a Nobel prize in Economics (Nash, 1950). Nash showed that 
cooperative bargaining would give an allocation that maximizes the product of each spouse’s 
surplus: 
(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑆𝑖) ∗ (𝑅𝑗 − 𝑆𝑗) 
subject to the household budget constraint. This solution is Pareto efficient, meaning that 
neither spouse can be made better off without making the other worse off. For example, if the 
wife’s treat point increases, she gets less from marriage and will be more inclined to leave. 
Hence, we can conclude that the allocation of resources to each spouse increases with their 
treat point. 
 
Hence, when the woman’s bargaining power increases, via, for example, income or education, 
etc., then the risk of dissolution increases, given that her man prefers her to stay at home. 
 
1.2 Empirical literature 
There are many studies that have investigated what makes couples separate. One of them is 
the study done by Liat Raz-Yorovich (Raz-Yurovich, 2012). In his study, he investigated the 
validity of two main groups of theories: one that asserts that wife’s work has a destabilizing 
effect on marriage and assumes asymmetry between the wife and the husband; another states 
that women’s employment has a stabilizing effect and assumes that relations between them 
are symmetric. He uses large-scale longitudinal register-based data for the Jewish population 
in Israel. The results he got showed asymmetry in the effect of the spouses’ economic 
characteristics on marital dissolution, meaning that the theories (such as discussed above) that 
assert asymmetry and power relations between the spouses can better explain the divorce rate 
in this group. The results also showed that when the wife earns as much as or more than her 
husband, the divorce risk in this group is highest. These findings were also in line with the 
bargaining models, which, as we have already discussed above, claim that the fraction of 





divorce threat-point (the utility she may receive in the event of separation (Pollak, 1994). It 
was also found that when the wife works long hours in the labor market, hence she is absent 
from home more often, the divorce risk increases. Now, it is important to notice that in a 
country such as Israel, the family is very important and central in a person’s life. Women are 
expected to take the main responsibility for the household tasks and for raising the children. 
Hence this dualism may be stronger in Israel than in other countries.   
Now, I would like to discuss the education and Norwegian work done by Lyngstad (2004). 
His study uses register, and census data on 54178 Norwegian first marriages started 1980-
1999. He uses a discrete-time hazard model for the estimations. His study showed a strong 
negative effect on divorce and no particularly harmful influence of heterogamy. Both 
husband’s and wife’s higher level of educational attainment reduced the risk of divorce. 
Lyngstad also pointed out that it is unclear why education is so important for divorce risk in 
Norway contra many other countries. A similar result was also found in the other Nordic 
studies (Kravdal & Noack, 1989; Hoem 1997; Jalovaara, 2003). Lyngstad (2004) controlled 
not only for the couple’s own educational attainment but also their parents and whether one of 
the spouses has taken further education after they become married. The results showed that 
spouses who had well-educated parents have a significantly higher risk of divorce than all 
other covariates. Further education led to an increased risk of divorce for both spouses. 
Nevertheless, a somewhat stronger effect was found for her level of education after marriage. 
Another study of interest is work done by Safura Moeeni (2019). The study discusses the 
effect of education on labor force participation of married women with endogenous 
bargaining power. For the estimations and testing of fitness, he uses data from 2006 to 2013 
Iranian Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES). In Moeeni’s model, bargaining 
power within the household is endogenous since educational choice and matching in the 
marriage market influence bargaining power. The findings showed that those women who 
matched with a low educated husband had the lowest utility value, but they had the biggest 
share of a small pie, or the wife had more bargaining power. A potential explanation for why 
highly educated women who marry men with low education are least happy is that highly 
educated women feel dissatisfied with the level of conversation and/or that men with low 
education have traditionalist gender norms.  Although this is not proven, an article by Schoen 





level is higher than his, the risk of separation increases. And the concept of happiness can 
potentially be explained as good conversations with a partner or the same understanding of 
life. 
 On the other hand, women with the lowest value of bargaining power (he was more educated 
than she was) had the highest value of utility. The results have also shown that women’s labor 
force participation (LFP) was an inverse U-shaped function of bargaining power. When the 
women’s bargaining power increases, she chooses to participate more in the labor force 
market. Nevertheless, when bargaining power exceeds a certain level, women choose to 
participate less in the labor market and choose home. This can be due to her high level of 
education and less opportunity for her in the labor market or due to the traditional view of 
gender responsibilities (Antecol, 2003). 
1.3 Hypotheses 
The overarching hypothesis of this thesis is that when a women’s bargaining power is higher 
than her husband’s bargaining power, the risk for household dissolution increases. 
Based on the previous theoretical and empirical research, I use women’s relative income, 
work time, education, and age as proxies for her relative bargaining power in the household. 
The specific hypotheses of this thesis are: 
The risk of separation when women: 
1. Earn a higher income than their husband 
2. Spend more time on market work than their husband 
3. Have a higher education than their husband 









This thesis’ analysis uses Norwegian register data from Statistics Norway (SSB). In 2018, the 
Norwegian Center for Research Data (NSD) and Statistics Norway (SSB) launched the online 
data portal and analysis tool microdata.no. This analysis tool makes the use of the register 
data in research less complicated. It is possible to analyze register data immediately since all 
the different variables contained in the register data are included in microdata.no. The 
variables found through the analytics tool include information on income, education, 
demographics, population characteristics like family size, gender, etc. The service is still 
under development, but as more variables are clarified, these are added to the database 
continuously. It is important to notice that confidentiality is secured, although the data is not 
anonymized. This means that the outputs you get are anonymous, and it is not possible to 
identify individuals. For example, noise is added to descriptive tables (+/-5), and it is not 
possible to make populations with fewer than 1000 individuals. The noise is visible in that the 
tables do not become additive. As with everything else, the analytic tool had to withstand 
certain limitations. Perhaps the biggest drawback is that researchers cannot use conventional 
statistics programs or analysis packages (like in an analytic program called R) together with 
microdata.no. This is due to the anonymization model to microdata.no shall ensure 
confidentiality throughout the analysis process. It is also not possible to familiarize yourself 
with the dataset you are using or check that processing and recoding have had the desired 
result  (Ballo, 2019; NSD & SSB, 2018). 
2.2 Sample 
My analytic sample contains couples who were still married at the time of the census (2017). 
Microdata.no has information on the individual level, and it is possible to link parents to 
children. Information about marital status is available. However, it is not possible to identify 
married couples directly in the data. To obtain information on both the spouses in a 
household, I, therefore, identify couples via their children. The variable bank for microdata.no 
has key variables for mother and father, which can be connected to the child’s individual data.  
To ensure that the parents are married, I first constructed a dataset consisting of children aged 
0-5 because this reduces the time to get divorced. I thereafter used the variable “children – 





variable has seven categories, where one of the categories provides information about all 
children who live with both parents where the parents are also married. The variable was 
connected to my observation group, which gave me information about which of the parent’s 
children lived with. Furthermore, I removed all the units that did not live with their married 
parents, keeping just these units that live with married parents. Now we can retrieve the 
information on the wife and the husband, but there is still a problem with duplicates. Because 
some families have several children, information on their parents is also the same for each 
household, which means that we have double information about the same household. To 
remove the duplicates, I had to go back to the variable overview and find a variable that 
describes the family using the age of the youngest person in the family. The variable was 
connected to my observation group, and after some coding (see appendix), it became possible 
to remove duplicates or siblings. Now each family has only one child (youngest) who lives 
with both mother and father, and mother and father are also married. Furthermore, 
information for both mother and father (who are married) was imported on their respective 
key variables. Information about salary, working hours, education and year of birth, marital 
status in 2017, and marital status in 2018.  
Although the variable “child - code for the number of parents in the household and the 
parents’ form of cohabitation” gave us information about the child living with both parents 
and the parents are married, it is the case that some couples still live together and are 
registered as married even if they are separated or have become widow/widower. To make 
sure we only work with couples who were still married in 2017, I had to remove those who 
were separated or became a widow/widower in 2017. The variables imported on the parent’s 
key variables and then merged with my observation group contain a variable called “marital 
status in 2017”. This variable, as expected, showed that my observation group indeed had 
both separated and widows/widowers. These were eventually removed from the dataset. The 
end result is then children who live with their married parents. Connected key variables also 
provide the opportunity to retrieve information about both mother(wife) and father(husband) 
simultaneously to the analysis area. Now it is possible to construct the dependent variable and 
the independent variables we need for this master thesis. It is important to notice that 
information retrieved is valid just for couples with small children. It is also essential to point 
out that it makes it difficult to analyze couples who do not have children, and thus we cannot 





My analytic sample includes 118479 married couples, 1913 (1,6%) of whom had separated 
the year after (2018). This analysis does not include cohabitors because I am not able to 
identify cohabitors in my database (as is usual with register data). But knowing that 
cohabitants in Norway have almost the same legal rights as married couples, results presented 
in this paper may also be used for this group.  
2.3 Variables 
The dependent variable is the log-odds of a divorce in the year 2018. It is coded one if the 
couple got separated in 2018 and zero otherwise. These outcomes depend on different 
explanatory variables, which are wife’s and husband’s hourly wage, weekly hours spent at 
work, education, and age.  
Below, I describe the main explanatory variables in the model. To test if households, where 
the woman has relatively more bargaining power than the man separates. I create variables 
that take the value one if the woman has or does relatively more than the man (see details 
below).  
2.3.1 The Log of the Hourly wage 
In this study, I use the hourly wage as an indication of bargaining power via income. 
Pollak (Pollak, 2005) argued that it is the wage rates, not earnings, that determine bargaining 
power between the spouses. This means that if a wife who does not work for pay while she is 
married or in a relationship might do so following divorce or separation, and her bargaining 
power would be linked to her wage rate, not her earnings while married. Further, Pollak 
claims that when a spouse’s earnings are high because she or he decides to allocate extra 
hours to market work and thus less time to leisure and to household production, the spouse 
does not have more bargaining power. However, if his or her earnings are high because of a 
high wage rate, bargaining power increases. On the other hand, Pollak (1994) claims that the 
spouse who has more control over recourses within the household also has more bargaining 
power. From a microeconomic perspective, control over resources can be interpreted as 
earnings. It may be noted that there is disagreement in the literature concerning whether it is 
the wage rate or total earnings that provide bargaining power in a household. Basu (Basu, 
2006) argues that earnings are a better measure of bargaining power than the wage rate. His 





choice reflects the balance of power in the household. There exist empirical evidence 
supporting Basu’s model (Koolwal & Ray, 2002; Maitra & Ray, 2005; Lancaster et al., 2008). 
In spite of the empirical support for the Basu (2016) model, I use the wage rate as an indicator 
of bargaining power in this study. My main motivation for doing so is that a high wage rate 
indicates high social status. To control for the choice of hours devoted to market work, I also 
control for work hours (see below). 
The wage rate variable was created as follows.  
The logs of the wife’s and husband’s hourly wage are computed separately by taking the log 
of the wife’s and husband’s hourly wage, which in turn were computed by first taking the 
annual wage and dividing it by the number of months in which they were working as salaried 
employees. In my case, we are looking at the divorce the year after (2017-2018); hence we are 
dividing by 12 to compute a monthly salary. Furthermore, to compute the weekly salary, I 
divide the monthly salary by 4.36 (based on the assumption that an average month has 30.5 
days, hence by dividing 30.5 by 7 (the week has seven days), we get 4.36). Finally, by 
dividing the weekly salary by the number of working hours per week, we get the hourly wage.  
2.3.2 Number of Work Hours per Week 
To test if time spent doing market work affects the probability to separate, I use three 
indicators’ variables: 1) A dummy taking the value one if the woman works full time, 2) A 
dummy taking the value one if the man works full time, and 3) A dummy taking the value one 
if the woman works more than the man. 
In a study done by Liat Raz – Yorovich (Raz-Yurovich, 2012), he found that when the wife 
works long hours in the labor market, hence she is absent from the home more often, the risk 
of divorce increases. The standard full-time workweek in Norway is 37.5 hours. To avoid 
treating people who work in a sector with lower standard work hours as part-time workers, I 
define full-time as working 35 hours per week or more.  
The dummy variable taking the value one if the woman works more than the man includes all 
women who work more than their husband, no matter how many hours he or she works. Note 





2.3.3 Highest Educational Degree  
Following Moeeni (Moeeni, 2019), which claims that education affects women’s inta-
household bargaining power, I use the highest education degree for each spouse as an 
indication for bargaining power via income.  
I use three indicator variables to test if bargaining power via education affects the probability 
to separate: Two dummy variables which take the value one if the woman and man have a 
university education, respectively, and one dummy variable taking the value one if the wife 
has a higher education than the husband. 
To know what education can be considered as high or low, I recoded spouse’s educational 
variable into two categories (levels): high educational level and low educational level (see 
appendix). Education is grouped to the Norwegian standard for education grouping 
(NUS)(SSB, 2019). NUS is a six-digit education code, where the 1st digit indicates the level 
of education. The level division intends to give the best possible picture of the structure of the 
Norwegian education system. The first digit shows the level of the education system for the 
highest level of education achieved for that person. If the first digit is 6, 7, or 8, the individual 
has a high level of education or education at the university level. If the first digit is 0, then a 
person does not have any education or has just a preschool education. All those who have 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 0 as the first digit are included in the low-level section. Hence, the variable 
univer_hlevel_(wife or husband) includes all those who have 6, 7, and 8 as the first digit. 
The dummy variable taking the value one if the wife has a higher education than the husband 
includes all women whose education is higher than the husbands no matter what her level of 
education is (low or high).  
2.3.4 Age and Age Difference 
I include age both as a control variable and as an indicator of bargaining power (being the 
elderly one).  
There exist several reasons to expect a negative effect of age on marital dissolution (South & 
Spitze, 1986). Younger people or today’s more modern generation have probably more 
relaxed attitudes towards divorce than older people. Older people may also have fewer 





may have less knowledge about their spouses than older couples, and they may have less 
experience in handling difficulties. Another factor is that the younger generation invests less 
in ‘marriage-specific investments’ (like, for example, common children, houses, etc.). Becker 
et al. (1977) has also discussed that a large age difference may be destabilizing for the 
marriage.   Since we do not have information about the duration of marriage or age of 
marriage in my data, including the age variable can indicate the effect of the existing duration 
of the marriage. 
Another important variable in the literature is the age difference. By including this variable, 
though, it is not possible to include the age of both wife and husband in the same analysis. 
This is because we get a problem with multicollinearity. Multicollinearity can disturb any 
regression model when working with more than one predictor. When, for example, two 
predictor variables overlap so much in what they measure, their effects become 
indistinguishable (Grace-Martin, 2019). 
The age difference is constructed as a dummy variable, coded one if the wife is older than the 
husband, and zero otherwise.   













Table 2: Descriptions of the variables 
Variables Description 
Dependent variable  
  
Separated / Not separated 0 if still married the year after  
  
 1 if separated the year after 
  
Explanatory variables  
  
Hourly wage, husband The husband’s average income in 2017 
 on the average working hours in 2017 
  
Hourly wage, wife The wife’s average income in 2017 on the 
average working hours in 2017 
  
Wife’s hourly wage > husband’s hourly 
wage 
The wife’s average hourly wage in 2017 
exceeds the husbands’ average hourly wage 
in 2017   
Weekly working hours,  
husband 
The husband’s working hours per week in 
2017 
  
Weekly working hours, 
wife 
The wife’s working hours per week in 2017 
  
Wife’s hours > husbands’ hours The wife’s working hours per week in 2017 
exceeds the husbands’ working hours per 
week in 2017   
Wife’s education – high level The wife’s level of education is bachelor’s 
degree or higher in 2017 
  
Husband’s education – high level The husband’s level of education is 
bachelor’s degree or higher in 2017 
  
Wife’s education > husbands  
education 
The wife’s level of education exceeds 







2.4 Econometric approach 
2.4.1 Econometric specification  
The equation/model that I would like to estimate is represented by equation below: 
 





















Here 𝛼 is an intercept, 𝑊𝑖,2017
𝑓
 and 𝑊𝑖,2017
𝑚  stands for an hourly wage for the wife (female) and 
for the husband (male), respectively. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖,2017
𝑓
 stands for wife’s hourly wage that 
exceeds the husband’s hourly wage.  𝐹𝑇𝑖,2017
𝑓
 and  𝐹𝑇𝑖,2017
𝑚  denotes that the wife and the 
husband work full-time, respectively. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑖,2017
𝑓
 stands for the wife’s working hours that 
exceed the husbands working hours. 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑖,2017
𝑓
 and 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑖,2017
𝑚  is the wife’s and the 
husband’s high level of education (university), respectively. The wife has a higher level of 
education than the husband is denoted by 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖,2017
𝑓





 stands for age difference when the wife is older than the 
husband.  
2.4.2 The Logistic Regression Model 
Since the intention is to examine the choice behavior of the individual, the logit and probit 
models are the appropriate models to choose. The probit model and the logit model are two 
nonlinear models for binary choice where choice probabilities remain between zero and one 
(Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2018). Let (𝑦𝑖 ,  𝒙𝒊), 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛 be observations with binary response 
𝑦𝑖 ∈  {0,1} on a covariate vector 𝒙𝑖. A nonlinear S-shaped “sigmoid” curve is used in those 
models to keep the choice probability 𝑝(𝑦𝑖) within the interval (0,1) ( please see (Hill et al., 
2018, p. 686) for the figure that shows S-shaped “sigmoid” curve). Assume now, for example, 
that 𝛽2 > 0, then, as an explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖 increases, 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖 increases, and the 





decreasing rate, keeping the probability less than one no matter how large the explanatory 
variable, 𝑥, becomes. The same principle also applies the other way, the probability 
approaches but never reaches zero. The change in probability, 𝑑𝑝(𝑦𝑖) 𝑑𝑥𝑖⁄ , is the slope of the 
probability curve, given a unit change in the explanatory variable, 𝑥𝑖. In other words, it is the 
marginal effect with the slope that is not constant (such as in the linear probability model). 
The probit and logit models, in binary choice cases, provide very similar inferences. Logit, 
however, is the most used model (NSD & SSB, 2020; Tutz, 2011), and it is also the model I 
use in this thesis.  
The logit model has the form  
 𝜋(𝒙𝑖) = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝒙𝑖
𝑇𝛽) (4.1) 









} = ln Ω(x) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ∙∙∙ +𝛽𝐾𝑥𝑖𝐾 = 𝒙𝑖
′𝜷 (4.2) 







The equation (4.2) is the log-odds that the alternative 𝑦 = 1 is chosen compared to the 
alternative 𝑦 = 0. Further, the model assuming 𝑝 explanatory variables, 𝒙𝑖 =
(𝑥𝑖1 = 1, 𝑥𝑖2, . . . , 𝑥𝑖𝐾). The 𝑝-dimensional vector, 𝜷, holds the parameters referring to the 
effects on 𝑥𝑖 for choosing the alternative 𝑦 = 1. Pr (𝑦 = 1|𝒙) is the probability that 
individual 𝑖 choose alternative 𝑦 = 1. These probabilities are defined as: 










   Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1+∙∙∙𝛽𝐾𝑥𝑖𝐾)
          
=  
exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 +∙∙∙ 𝛽𝐾𝑥𝑖𝐾)




Then the probabilities 𝑦 = 0 can be defined as: 
 Pr(𝑦 = 0|𝒙) = 
1
1 + exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 +∙∙∙ 𝛽𝐾𝑥𝑖𝐾)
 (4.5) 
 
                                                                                  (Hill et al., 2018; Long & Freese, 2014) 
 
Since this thesis investigates whether the probability of separation is affected by a change in 
the explanatory variables, the marginal effects will be calculated for interpretation. A 
marginal effect shows the change in the probability of an outcome for a change in one of the 
explanatory variables. The critical notion here is that one variable is changing while the other 














Here 𝛽𝑥1 denotes the log-odds ratios for variable 𝑥1. 𝛽𝑥𝑖 is the linear combination of values 
on variable 𝑥 and their estimated coefficients 𝛽, or we can also call it the value of the logit for 
the 𝑖-th observation. The pdf (probability density function) of the logistic distribution 
regarding 𝛽𝑥𝑖 is 𝑓(𝛽𝑥𝑖). Hence, the average marginal effect (AME) states the average effect 
of 𝑥1 on Pr(𝑦 = 1). This is done by taking the logistic pdf at each observation’s estimated 
logit, multiplying this by the coefficient for 𝑥1, and then averaging the product over all 
observations (Mood, 2010).  
When AME is bigger than zero, an increase in an explanatory variable, 𝑥, increases the 





increase in explanatory variable decreases the likelihood of choosing one alternative (Hill et 






















3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3: Means and standard deviations of the economic variables (N = 118,474) 
 
Variable  Mean (%) SD 
 Wife’s hourly wage   214  196 
 Husband’s hourly wage 306   233 
 
Wife’s hourly wage is higher 
than her husband’s 
0.27 0.45 
 
Wife works full-time 0.47 0.50 
 Husband works full-time 0.73 0.44 
 
Wife works more than husband 
(hours) 
0.10 0.30 
 Higher education (wife) 0.60 0.49 
 Higher education (husband) 0.46 0.50 
 
Wife has higher education  
than husband 
0.47 0.50 
Note: For binary variables  
the mean represents the 
percentage of these 
receiving the value of one 
Age difference 
(Wife is older than husband) 
0.15 0.35 
 
The descriptive statistics show that married women, on average, have much lower hourly 
wages than their husbands. Her average hourly wage is 214 NOK, while his average hourly 
wage is 306 NOK. It is important to point out that those with zero income were also included 
in the analysis.  The proportion of women who have a higher hourly wage than their husbands 
is 27%. The husband dominates when it comes to working full-time. The proportion of men 
(husband) who work full-time is 73%, while it is only 47% for women (wife). Nor is there 
such a large proportion of women who works more than their husband (10%). On the other 
hand, there is a larger proportion of women (60%) than men (46%) who have higher 





Again, the variable addresses both the low and high levels of education of the woman. 
Meaning that it does not matter in which category her level of education lies, as long as it is 
higher than her husband’s. Finally, in this observation group, 15% of women are older than 
their husbands. 
 
3.2 Econometric analysis 
To test the hypothesis that a relatively high bargaining power among women increases the 
risk of household dissolution, I run a logit regression. The logit model, equation (4.2), gives 
the log-odds estimated. The log-odds estimates are presented in the appendix. However, the 
changes in log-odds are not substantively meaningful to the most audience (the slope of the 
graph of the logit changes as probability moves from 0 to 1. Thus, the change in the 
probability that 𝑦 = 1 caused by a one-unit increase in an independent variable and holding 
the other independent variables constant will vary as we move from 𝑦 = 0 to 𝑦 = 1) (Long & 
Freese, 2014; Studenmund, 2011). Hence, the average marginal effects are used for 
interpretation.  
The average marginal effects for all the explanatory variables are presented in table 4: 
Table 4: Estimated average marginal effects of economic characteristics on separation 
Variable  
                                                          
Margin 
Log of wife’s hourly wage   -0.00016 
(0.00021) 
Log of husband’s hourly wage  -0.0007*** 
(0.00026) 
Wife’s hourly wage is higher 
than her husband’s 
    0.00304*** 
(0.00104) 
Wife works full time 0.00192** 
(0.00092) 
Husband works full time  -0.00106 
(0.00128) 










High-level education - husband  -0.0055*** 
(0.00095) 
Wife has higher education 
than husband 
     0.0032*** 
(0.00087) 
Wife’s age 0.00294** 
(0.0014) 
Wife’s age squared  -0.03721** 
(0.01641) 
Age differences        0.00315*** 
(0.00102) 
Number of observations  118 474 
Log likelihood   - 9609.52 
LR chi2(13) 362.047 
Prob > chi2 0 
Pseudo R2 0.01849 
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.  
Standard deviation in parenthesis 
 
The results presented in table 4 show that when the wife’s hourly wage increases, the 
probability of being separated decreases. Although the marginal effect shows a stabilizing 
effect on separation, it also shows that the variable is not significant. This means that her 
hourly wage does not affect the dependent variable or the likelihood of separation. On the 
other hand, the husband’s hourly wage, which is also negative and has a stabilizing effect on 
the relationship, is significant. This telling us that when the husband’s hourly wage increases, 
it contributes positively to the marriage and does explain the separation rate.  
However, the results show that couples in which the wife’s hourly wage exceeds her 
husband’s hourly wage have a higher probability of separation. The marginal effect is positive 
and significant. The result confirms the first hypothesis and is in line with Pollak’s (2005) 
theory, which states that couples in which the wife’s hourly wage exceeds her husband’s 
hourly wage have a higher probability of separation.  
Further, the results show that when the wife works full-time, the marginal effect on separation 
is positive and significant. The marginal effect of the husband’s full-time, on the other hand, 
is negative and not significant. Finally, when the wife’s working hours exceed the husband’s 





Yurovich’s (Raz-Yurovich, 2012) findings confirming that when the wife is more absent from 
home, the separation risk increases. On the other hand, the results do not confirm my second 
hypothesis, stating that it doesn’t really matter if she works more than he does.  
The marginal effects of education on the probability of separation are negative and significant 
for both spouses. The effect of the wife’s higher education is substantially larger than for the 
husband, and it is almost twice as great. However, when her level of education exceeds his 
level of education, the effect becomes positive and significant. Again, the results are in line 
with Yurovich’s (2012) findings confirming that when the wife’s level of education is high, 
the better it is for the marriage.  The result is also in line with Becker et al. (1977) claim that 
individuals with a high level of education will have higher gains from marriage, and therefore 
lower gains from divorce (Gary S Becker et al., 1977, p. 1146). The positive and significant 
effect of the wife’s level of education that exceeds the husband’s level of education confirms 
my third hypothesis. The result is also in line with Moeeni’s (2019) study, suggesting that her 
bargaining power increases when she is more educated than he is. 
Finally, the results show a positive and significant marginal effect of the wife’s age on the 
probability of separation. From the second-order term, which is negative and significant, we 
can conclude that the effect decreases with age. The marginal effect of age difference on the 
probability of separation is also positive and significant. The result confirms my fourth 
hypothesis indicating that being “the older one” gives one more bargaining power. The result 
is also in line with homogamy literature (see, e.g., (Gentleman & Park, 1994)), and in line 
with Becker et al. (1977), who has discussed that large age differences may be destabilizing 










Well, is it the power of love or love of the power? It seems like it all started when women 
began to participate in the labor market and take higher educations, gaining more power in 
decision-making in all directions. With detraditionalization, several important questions 
appear on the surface. One of the questions is addressed in this master’s thesis: Can the 
woman’s bargaining power in a marriage provoke separation? Since the frequency of 
separation between married couples and also between cohabitants has increased, it is natural 
to seek an explanation for why this happens. 
In this master thesis, I used the hourly wage, work time, educational level, and age as the 
measure of women’s bargaining power. My results confirmed three of my hypotheses, i.e., 
that when the wife’s hourly wage, educational level, and age are higher than her husband’s, 
the probability of household dissolution increases. My results do not support the hypothesis 
that when the wife’s working hours exceed the husband’s working hours, the probability of 
separation increases.  
Below, I provide a possible explanation of the null result for bargaining power via relative 
work hours.  
My observation group is couples with young children, and following the sociologists, there 
are strong norms against divorce when couples have children (Thornton, 1977). The effect of 
children is especially strong when there are young children in the household (Waite & Lillard, 
1991; White, 1990). Young children demand more money, effort, and time than older children 
(A. Cherlin, 1979). Another study argues that the gender division of labor in the household is 
more specialized when children are small (Waite & Lillard, 1991). It is also essential to notice 
that it is women’s, rather than men’s daily life, that is most affected according to whether or 
not they have small children (Craig & Mullan, 2010).  Hence time allocation between spouses 
when they have small children may differ from the time allocation when they do not have 
children or have older children. The results presented are valid just for the couples with small 
children, and following sociologists, they confirm that couple’s time allocation, when having 
small children, do not affect the separation rate in the same way. However, my results show a 





separation, which can indicate that she has too little time for household work (conflict over 
who does what and how much), and in turn, increase the probability of household dissolution. 
Even though detraditionalization and “normal” gender norms are most marked in Norway, the 
results suggest that there still exists a struggle for power within the household and that 
traditional gender norms still live quietly within the household. There is still a larger 
proportion of women than men who work part-time and earn the least. And although women 
also hold high positions in male-dominated occupations, there are not many of them (SSB, 
2021). The possible explanation can be that there is still less opportunity for women in the 
labor market, or it can be due to the traditional view of gender responsibilities, also in 
Norway.  
4.1 Future research/limitations 
If I am to go further with this, it would have been interesting to include more information 
about social norms and estimate interaction effects.  
 
Although the model in this thesis is very simple, the implications are important. In Norway, 
only 5.1% agree with traditional norms; however, my analyses suggest that gender conflict is 
still an issue. This is perhaps not completely surprising, but as Levine et al. (Levine et al., 













Antecol, H. (2003). Why is there cross-country variation in female labor force participation 
rates? The role of male attitudes toward family and sex roles. Retrieved from  
Ballo, J. G. (2019). Microdata. no: Ny teknologi gir forskere umiddelbar tilgang til norske 
registerdata.  
Basu, K. (2006). Gender and say: A model of household behaviour with endogenously 
determined balance of power. The Economic Journal, 116(511), 558-580.  
Becker, G. S. (1991). A treatise on the family (Enl. ed. ed.). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Becker, G. S., Landes, E. M., & Michael, R. T. (1977). An economic analysis of marital 
instability. Journal of political Economy, 85(6), 1141-1187.  
Cherlin, A. (1979). Work life and marital dissolution. Divorce and separation: Context, 
causes and consequences, 151-166.  
Cherlin, A. J. (2004). The deinstitutionalization of American marriage. Journal of marriage 
and family, 66(4), 848-861.  
Craig, L., & Mullan, K. (2010). Parenthood, gender and work‐family time in the United 
States, Australia, Italy, France, and Denmark. Journal of Marriage and Family, 72(5), 
1344-1361.  
Ellingsæter, A. L. (2018). Bryllup i avtradisjonaliseringens tidsalder. Tidsskrift for 
samfunnsforskning, 59(03), 261-279.  
Gentleman, J. F., & Park, E. (1994). Age differences of married and divorcing couples. 
Health Reports, 6(2), 225-240.  
Grace-Martin, K. (2019). Eight Ways to Detect Multicollinearity. Retrieved from 
https://www.theanalysisfactor.com/eight-ways-to-detect-multicollinearity/ 
Hill, R. C., Griffiths, W. E., & Lim, G. C. (2018). Principles of econometrics: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Hoem, J. M. (1997). Educational gradients in divorce risks in Sweden in recent decades. 
Population studies, 51(1), 19-27.  
ISSP, R. G. (2016). International Social Survey Programme: Family and Changing Gender 
Roles IV - ISSP 2012. In: GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5900 Datenfile Version 4.0.0, 
https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12661. 
Jalovaara, M. (2003). The joint effects of marriage partners’ socioeconomic positions on the 
risk of divorce. Demography, 40(1), 67-81.  
Kalmijn, M. (2007). Explaining cross-national differences in marriage, cohabitation, and 
divorce in Europe, 1990–2000. Population studies, 61(3), 243-263.  
Koolwal, G., & Ray, R. (2002). Estimating the endogenously determined intrahousehold 
balance of power and its impact on expenditure pattern: evidence from Nepal: The 
World Bank. 
Kravdal, Ø., & Noack, T. (1989). Like marries like–the safest choice. Scandinavian 
Population Studies, 9, 243-258.  
Lancaster, G., Maitra, P., & Ray, R. (2008). Household expenditure patterns and gender bias: 
Evidence from selected Indian states. Oxford Development Studies, 36(2), 133-157.  
Levine, T. R., Kim, R. K., & Hamel, L. M. (2010). People lie for a reason: Three experiments 
documenting the principle of veracity. Communication Research Reports, 27(4), 271-
285.  
Long, J. S., & Freese, J. (2014). Regression models for categorical dependent variables using 





Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1996). Bargaining and distribution in marriage. Journal of 
economic perspectives, 10(4), 139-158.  
Lyngstad, T. H. (2004). The impact of parents’ and spouses’ education on divorce rates in 
Norway. Demographic research, 10, 121-142.  
Maitra, P., & Ray, R. (2005). The impact of intra household balance of power on expenditure 
pattern: The Australian evidence. Australian Economic Papers, 44(1), 15-29.  
Manser, M., & Brown, M. (1980). Marriage and household decision-making: A bargaining 
analysis. International economic review, 31-44.  
Moeeni, S. (2019). Married women’s labor force participation and intra-household bargaining 
power. Empirical Economics, 1-38.  
Mood, C. (2010). Logistic regression: Why we cannot do what we think we can do, and what 
we can do about it. European sociological review, 26(1), 67-82.  
Nash, J. (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18(2), 155-162.  
NSD & SSB. (2018). About microdata.no. Retrieved from https://microdata.no/about/ 
NSD & SSB. (2020). Brukermanual for analysesystemet microdata.no. Retrieved from 
https://microdata.no/brukermanual-no.pdf 
Pollak, R. A. (1994). For better or worse: The roles of power in models of distribution within 
marriage. The American Economic Review, 84(2), 148-152.  
Pollak, R. A. (2005). Bargaining power in marriage: Earnings, wage rates and household 
production. Retrieved from  
Raz-Yurovich, L. (2012). Economic Determinants of Divorce Among Dual-Earner Couples: 
Jews in Israel. European journal of population, 28(2), 177-203. doi:10.1007/s10680-
012-9256-3 
Schoen, R., Astone, N. M., Kim, Y. J., Rothert, K., & Standish, N. J. (2002). Women's 
employment, marital happiness, and divorce. Social forces, 81(2), 643-662.  
Sobotka, T., & Toulemon, L. (2008). Overview Chapter 4: Changing family and partnership 
behaviour: Common trends and persistent diversity across Europe. Demographic 
research, 19, 85-138.  
South, S. J., & Spitze, G. (1986). Determinants of divorce over the marital life course. 
American sociological review, 583-590.  
SSB. (2019). Hvordan klassifiseres en persons høyeste utdanningsnivå. Retrieved from 
https://www.ssb.no/utdanning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/hvordan-klassifiseres-en-
persons-hoyeste-utdanningsniva 
SSB. (2020). Saktere nedgang i lønnsforkjellene mellom kvinner og menn. Retrieved from 
https://kildekompasset.no/referansestiler/apa-6th/ 
SSB. (2021). Indikatorer for kjønnslikestilling i kommunene. Retrieved from 
https://www.ssb.no/likekom 
Studenmund, A. H. (2011). Using econometrics : a practical guide (6th ed. ed.). Boston: 
Pearson. 
Thornton, A. (1977). Children and marital stability. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 531-
540.  
Tutz, G. (2011). Regression for Categorical Data. New York: New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Waite, L. J., & Lillard, L. A. (1991). Children and marital disruption. American journal of 
sociology, 96(4), 930-953.  
White, L. K. (1990). Determinants of divorce: A review of research in the eighties. Journal of 






 Appendix A: Categorization of education levels. The first digit classification 
(NUS) in parenthesis.  
Levels Education degree 
  
High a. University and college education, short (6) 
 
   - Anyone who has completed a degree of a 
duration of up to 4 years 
   - Anyone who has completed 120 credits or 
more in the university and college system, but 
who has not completed a degree 
  - All who have completed a university and 
college education of a duration of up to four 
years up to and including the academic year 
1997/98 
 
b. University and college education, long (7,8) 
   - Anyone who has completed a university and 
     college education of more than four years. 
   - Anyone who has completed a research 
education/doctoral degree regardless of period. 
    
Low a. No education or preschool education (0) 
 
b. Primary school level (1,2) 
   - Anyone who has completed and passed an 
elementary school education. Today, everyone 
who completes an elementary school education 
in Norway passes regardless of the results 
 
c. High school level (3,4) 
   - Everyone who has completed upper 
secondary education, regardless of the length of 
the education up to and including the school year 
1974/75 
   -Everyone who has completed upper secondary  
    education up to and including the school year 
1974/75 
   - All those who have completed and passed a 
higher education of a duration of three years or 
more from the school year 1995/96, i.e., mainly 
upper secondary course II / Vg3 education, or 






d. Vocational school level (5) 
   - All those who have completed educations 
based on upper secondary school, but who are 
not approved as university and college education  







































Appendix C (microdata.no syntax) 
create-dataset children 
/// Retrieves information about children age 0-5 and removes siblings 
/// Also, here children live with their married parents (foreldrekode == 1) 
 
import fdb4/BEFOLKNING_STATUSKODE 2018-01-01 as status 
import fdb4/BEFOLKNING_KJOENN as kjønn 
import fdb4/BEFOLKNING_FAR_FNR as far_nr 
import fdb4/BEFOLKNING_MOR_FNR as mor_nr 
import fdb4/BEFOLKNING_YNGST_I_REGSTAT_FAMNR 2017-01-01 as yngst 
import fdb4/BEFOLKNING_FORELDREKODE 2017-01-01 as foreldrekode 
import fdb4/BEFOLKNING_FOEDSELS_AAR_MND as birthyear 
generate får = int(birthyear/100) 
generate alder = 2017 - int(birthyear /100) 
keep if status == '1' & alder >= 0 & alder <= 5 & foreldrekode == '1' 
histogram får, discrete 
histogram alder, discrete 
histogram yngst, discrete 
summarize får alder yngst 
tabulate alder yngst, missing 
generate eryngst = 0 
replace eryngst = 1 if sysmiss(yngst) | alder == yngst + 1 
tabulate eryngst 
tabulate alder yngst if eryngst, missing 
keep if eryngst 
 
///Retrieves information about mother (wife)  
/// and merges with child’s data through the mother’s key variable 
 
create-dataset mor_data 
import fdb4/BEFOLKNING_FOEDSELS_AAR_MND as birthyear 
generate age_wife = 2017 - int(birthyear /100) 
import fdb4/NUDB_BU 2017-01-01 as educ_mor 
import fdb4/REGSYS_ARB_ARBEIDSTID 2017-11-16 as arbtid_mor 
import fdb4/INNTEKT_WLONN 2017-01-01 as lønn_mor 
import fdb4/SIVSTANDFDT_SIVSTAND 2017-01-01 as sivstand17_mor 
import fdb4/SIVSTANDFDT_SIVSTAND 2018-01-01 as sivstand18_mor 
merge age_wife educ_mor arbtid_mor lønn_mor sivstand17_mor sivstand18_mor into 






/// Retrieves information about father (husband) 




import fdb4/BEFOLKNING_FOEDSELS_AAR_MND as birthyear 
generate age_husband = 2017 - int(birthyear /100) 
import fdb4/NUDB_BU 2017-01-01 as educ_far 
import fdb4/REGSYS_ARB_ARBEIDSTID 2017-11-16 as arbtid_far 
import fdb4/INNTEKT_WLONN 2017-01-01 as lønn_far 
import fdb4/SIVSTANDFDT_SIVSTAND 2017-01-01 as sivstand17_far 
import fdb4/SIVSTANDFDT_SIVSTAND 2018-01-01 as sivstand18_far 
merge age_husband educ_far arbtid_far lønn_far sivstand17_far sivstand18_far into children 
on far_nr 
 
/// Removes those who live together but are separated or have become a widow/widower year 
2017 
/// Retains only those who are actually married in the year 2017 





keep if sivstand17_mor == '2' & sivstand17_far == '2' 
drop if sysmiss(sivstand18_far ) 
drop if sysmiss(sivstand18_mor ) 
 
/// Dependent variable  
generate separate18 = 0 
replace separate18 = 1 if sivstand18_far == '5' & sivstand18_mor == '5' 
tabulate separate18 
 
///Re-codes for the educational levels (high and low) 
/// Missing are included in a low-level of education (Do not have any) 
 
generate husband_educ = substr(educ_far, 1,3) 
generate wife_educ = substr(educ_mor, 1,3) 
destring husband_educ , force 






recode husband_educ (99/199 = 1) (201/299 = 2) (301/399 = 3) (401/499 = 4) (501/599 = 5) 
(601/699 = 6) (701/799 = 7) (811/899 = 8) (missing = 1) 
tabulate wife_educ 
recode wife_educ (99/199 = 1) (201/299 = 2) (301/399 = 3) (401/499 = 4) (501/599 = 5) 
(601/699 = 6) (701/799 = 7) (811/899 = 8) (missing = 1) 
tabulate wife_educ 
 
/// Dummy-variable for high-level of education (wife and husband) 
 
generate univer_hlevel_husband = 0 
replace univer_hlevel_husband = 1 if husband_educ >= 6 & husband_educ <=8 
tabulate univer_hlevel_husband 
generate univer_hlevel_wife = 0 
replace univer_hlevel_wife = 1 if wife_educ >= 6 & wife_educ <=8 
 
///Dummy-variable wife’s education is higher than husband’s 
 
generate wife_educ_higher = 0 
replace wife_educ_higher = 1 if educ_mor > educ_far 
 
///Hourly wage mothers/father in 2017  
///Those with zero hourly wage are also included 
 
generate wife_hourly_wage = (lønn_mor/12/4.36)/ arbtid_mor 
replace wife_hourly_wage = 0 if sysmiss(wife_hourly_wage ) 
generate husband_hourly_wage = (lønn_far/12/4.36)/ arbtid_far 
replace husband_hourly_wage = 0 if sysmiss(husband_hourly_wage ) 
summarize husband_hourly_wage wife_hourly_wage 
 
///Log of hourly wage wife/husband 
 
generate wife_hourly_wagelog = log(wife_hourly_wage ) 
replace wife_hourly_wagelog = 0 if wife_hourly_wage == 0 
generate husband_hourly_wagelog = log(husband_hourly_wage ) 
replace husband_hourly_wagelog = 0 if husband_hourly_wage == 0 
 
///Dummy-variable wife’s hourly wage is higher than husband’s  
 
generate wife_hwage_higher = 0 
replace wife_hwage_higher = 1 if wife_hourly_wagelog > husband_hourly_wagelog 
 
/// Dummy-variable fulltime wife/husband  
 
generate wife_fulltime = 0 
replace wife_fulltime = 1 if arbtid_mor >= 35 
generate husband_fulltime = 0 






/// Dummy-variable wife works more hours than the husband 
 
generate wife_worktime_higher = 0 
replace wife_worktime_higher = 1 if arbtid_mor > arbtid_far 
tabulate wife_worktime_higher 
 
/// Controll variable age2 and age-differnce. Age-difference variable is a dummy variable  
 
generate age2_wife = sqrt(age_wife ) 
generate age_diference = 0 




logit separate18 wife_hourly_wagelog husband_hourly_wagelog wife_hwage_higher 
wife_fulltime husband_fulltime wife_worktime_higher univer_hlevel_wife 
univer_hlevel_husband wife_educ_higher age_wife age2_wife age_diference , mfx(dydx ) 
 
 
 
 
 
